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Article 8

RECENT CASE NOTES
CARRERS-NEGLIGENCF--DuTY OF CARRIRS TO PASSENGERS.-The minor
son of the plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's cars in the city
of Terre Haute. The car was a "one man" car and was in the sole charge
of the motorman, whose station was near the door which formed the exit
of the car. Evans (the deceased son) informed the motorman that he
wished to alight at the intersection of 19th street and Beech Street. Upon
arrival at the intersection, the motorman stopped the car and opened the
door, which was on the east side, in order that Evans might alight. At
the time the door was opened and as Evans was alighting from the car,
an automobile operated by one Pierce was approaching the traction car
along and upon the east side of 19th Street at a dangerous rate of speed.
The motorman saw the approaching automobile, but failed to warn Evans
thereof. Evans alighted but before he could reach the east curb of the
street was struck by the automobile and killed. The Acts of 1917, c. 106,
p. 337, make it unlawful for the operator of a motor vehicle to pass a
street car at a lateral distance of less than 20 feet, on the streets of any
town or city of this state, when such car has been stopped to permit passengers to alight. This action is against the traction company and Pierce,
the complaint against the traction company being the alleged negligence
of the motorman in failing to warn Evans of the approaching automobile,
and in permitting him to leave the car and alight therefrom at the time.
Traction company demurred. Overruled. Held: Judgment for defendant
traction company. Terre Haute, I. & E. Traction Co. v. Evans. App.
Court, April 5, 1928, 161 N. E. 671.
A motorman of a street car in opening the door to permit passengers
to alight has the right to assume, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary, that, in compliance with the statute, an automobilist would pass the
street car at a lateral distance of not less than 20 feet. If the width of the
street is such as to make it impossible for an automobile to pass at a lateral
distance of not less than 20 feet in compliance with the statute, a motorman
has a right to assume, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary, that
the automobilist will stop while passengers are alighting from the car.
Louisville Traction Co. v. Lottich, 59 Ind. App. 426; Elgin Dairy Co. v.
Shepherd, 183 Ind. 466; Cole Motor Car Co. v. Ludrof, 111 N. E. 447,
Street railway companies operate their cars on tracks laid in streets, and
use the streets in common with other vehicles. It follows, therefore, that
their duties to passengers alighting from their cars are not the same as
the duties of those commercial railways which operate their cars and discharge passengers on their own rights of way over which they have
complete control. Creamer v. West End St. Ry. Co., 31 N. E. 391; Hayes
v. United Ry. Co., 93 Atl. 226. Street railway companies carrying passengers in ordinary public streets or highways are not negligent in not
providing means for warning passengers about to leave a car of the
danger of colliding with or being run over by other vehicles in the street.
The risk of being hurt by such vehicles is the risk of the passenger and
not that of the carrier. It is not a danger against which a carrier is bound
to protect the passengers or to give him warning. Oddy v. West End. St.
Ry. Co., 59 N. E. 1027; Ruddy v. Ingebret, 204 N. W. 630; Cleveland Ry.
Co. v. Arrison, 159 N. E. 580; Jacobson v. Omaha & St. B. R. Co., 191
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N. W. 327. It seems, however, that the following doctrine could have been
applied to the facts of this case. This doctrine (the humanitarian doctrine) proceeds upon precepts of humanity and of natural justice, to the
end that every person (who owes a duty to use care toward another) shall
exercise ordinary care for the protection of that other after seeing him in
peril or about to become imperiled, when such injury may be averted without injury to others. Banks v. Empire Electric Co., 2nd series, 4 S. W. 875.
The facts as set forth in the case state that the motorman saw the automobile approaching at a dangerous rate of speed and failed to warn Evans
thereof. If such an allegation appeared in the complaint, defendants by
their demurrer admitted it. Then didn't the motorman have sufficient
knowledge of Evans' peril to bring the case within the doctrine just
quoted? By opening the doors of the car, the motorman invited Evans to
alight. He saw Evans' peril, a peril of which deceased was not cognizant,
and as the relation of passenger and carrier had not terminated, did not
the motorman owe a duty to Evans which is sufficient to overcome the preR. H. L.
sumption the court drew from the statute?
LAw-ComERcn---PoLicE PowER-TAXATON-DeCoNsTITUTIoNAL
fendant operated a motor bus between South Bend, Indiana, and Niles,
Michigan. His business was chiefly interstate, though he did carry some
intrastate passengers. The city of South Bend, by ordinance prohibited
the operation of its streets of any bus for hire without a license from the
city. Before the license could issue, the applicant was required to file a
contract of liability insurance providing for the payment -of a judgment
for damages to person or property resulting from the negligent operation
of the bus within the city. The license fees vary with the seating capacity
of the bus; for defendant's bus with seats for twelve, the fee is fifty dollars
a year. The ordinance makes no distinction with respect to busses engaged
in interstate commerce. Defendant paid the state registration fee but
refused to apply for a city license. When prosecuted, he claimed that the
ordinance violated the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Held:
Judgment for city reversed. A license fee, imposed on an interstate bus
is void as a direct burden on interstate commerce unless limited to an
inspection fee, or to a reasonable excise for the use of the streets or highways, or an occupation tax imposed solely on account of intrastate business.
Sprout v. City of South Bend, Supreme Court of the United States, May 14,
1928, 48 Sup. Ct. 502.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, disregarding defendant's intrastate business, based its decision on the broad ground that, "since defendant used
the city streets in the indiscriminate solicitation and acceptance of passengers" he was, "within the police power of the state to license and regulate
both driver and vehicle by way of providing for the safety, security, and
general welfare of the public." As bus traffic has been largely local in
character and the federal government has been slow te legislate in this
field, the states have naturally regulated the operation of motor vehicles.
See Motor CarrierRegulation: Federal,State, and Municipal, D. E. Lilienthall and I. S. Rosenbaum, 26 Columbia Law Rev. 954. As an exercise of
the police power, the state may prescribe uniform and non-discriminatory
regulations upon the operation, on its highways, of all motor busses, though
engaged in interstate commerce. Morris v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135; Kane v.
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Now Jersey, 242 U. S. 160. If the business is not national in scope, this
may be explained on the theory that the states have concurrent power
with the federal government, in the absence of federal legislation. If the
business is national in scope and admits only of one uniform system of
regulation, this may be-explained on the theory that the state may exercise
an incidental and indirect regulation, though the power of the federal
government is exclusive. The reasonableness of state regulation is always
subject to federal inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce.
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610. A state inspection fee imposed
upon interstate busses will be sustained when it does not materially exceed
the cost of its supervision. Adams Express Company v. New York, 232
U. S. 14; Foote v. Maryland, 232 U. S. 494. The states may require automobile insurance of motor busses even though engaged in interstate commerce, if limited to damages suffered in the state by persons other than
passengers. Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554; Red Ball Transit Company v.
Marshall, 8 F. (2d) 635. The state may impose a reasonable excise upon
busses in interstate commerce as their fair contribution to the cost of
the construction and maintenance of its highways; Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S.
554; such a tax is a direct burden on interstate commerce when it falls
with disproportionate economic weight on the interstate carrier or is so
large as to obstruct interstate commerce. Interstate Busses Corporation
v. Blodgett, 48 Sup. Ct. 230. The license tax is void as an occupation tax
unless imposed solely on account of intrastate business. Postal Telegraph
Cable Company v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692. The state courts erred in
failing to require the city to establish the license fee as one which it might
impose constitutionally upon a bus engaged in interstate commerce. For
general discussion of motor vehicle regulation see articles in 26 Columbia
Law Rev. 954; 22 Illinois Law Rev. 47; 75 University of Pennsylvania
Law Rev. 696; 76 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 548, 690; and 36
Yale Law Journal, 163.
M. R. H.
INFANTS-PRINCIPAL AND SuRETY-AvowANC---LiAB.nTY op SuRaTV.One Clyde McKee, an infant, and known to all parties concerned to be
such, purchased an automobile from appellees, making a down payment,
and agreeing to pay the balance of $570 in installments. To secure the
contract he gave his note signed by himself and the appellants, the latter
as sureties. McKee, after part payment, disaffirmed the contract, returned
the automobile to appellees, and demanded the return of the money paid
by him. Upon appellee's refusal, McKee sued. Appellees filed cross-complaint to recover from appellants, as sureties on the note, the balance
remaining unpaid on said contract of purchase. To a finding for appellees,
appellants filed motion for a new trial. Motion overruled, and judgment
rendered for appellees. This action of the court assigned as error. Held
-Affirmed. A principal's disaffirmance of his contract by a purely personal plea in the nature of a privilege or protection, such as infancy or
coverture, does not have the effect of releasing his sureties under the
rule that release of one joint obligor is a release of all, whether principals
or sureties. McKee et al. v. Harwood Automotive Co., Appellate Court of
Indiana, Feb. 23, 1928, 162 N. E. 62.
The general rule that the release- or discharge of a principal releases
the surety does not apply where a person sui juris guarantees the obliga-
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tion of, or becomes surety for, a minor, married woman, or other person
incapable of contracting. In such cases the defense is personal and does
not affect the liability of the surety. Garner v. Cook, 30 Ind. 331; Davis
v. Statts, 43 Ind. 103, 13 Am. Rep. 309; Hicks v. Randolph, 62 Tenn.
(3 Baxt.) 352, 27 Am. Rep. 760; Gates v. Tebbetts, 83 Neb. 573, 119 N. W.
1120. The possibility of such defenses may be the very reason why the
promisee demands a surety, and the latter is held liable in the absence of
fraud, duress, deceit, or violation of law or public policy on the part of
the promisee. Winn v. Sanford, 145 Mass. 302, 14 N. E. 119; Yale v.
Wheelock, 109 Mass. 502; Davis v. Staits, supra. If a joint co-promisor
is an infant, the promisee, in an action brought upon the contract, cannot
consider the contract as void as to the infant, but must join him as a
party defendant. Wamsley v. Lindenberger, 2 Rand. 478; Slocum v.
Hooker, 13 Barb. 536; and if a. defendant in an action against two upon
contract, sets up his infancy as a defense, the plaintiff may enter a nolle
prosequi or discontinue as to him, and proceed to judgment against the
other defendants. Kirby v. Cannon, 9 Ind. 371; Britton v. Wheeler, 8
Blackf. 31; Taylor v. Dansby, 42 Mich. 82; or of course, the plaintiff may
try the question of infancy, and if found against him, may still have judgment against the other defendants. Cutts v. Gordon, 13 Me. 474; Craig v.
Van Bebber, 18 Am. St. Rep. 569. It has been held that where the infant
disaffirms his contract and restores the other party to status quo, the surety
of the minor cannot be held liable further, on the ground that it would be
inequitable for the creditor to have both the property and the consideration for the same. Lagerquist v. Bankers' Bond & Mortg. Guaranty Co.,
205 N. W. 977 (Iowa); Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 802; Evants v. Taylor,
18 N. M. 371, 137 Pac. 583; Nations v. Gregg (C. C. A.), 290 Fed. 157.
However, it does not follow that the creditor has been placed in status quo
upon receiving back the property, for the benefit of the contract is lost,
and the consideration may be of such a nature that it has deteriorated in
value. 2 Cal. Law Review, 337. Under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, the rule as laid down in the Lagerquist case is unnecessary, for in
every case where one pays the debt for which another is primarily liable,
and which that other in equity and good conscience should have paid, he
becomes subrogated to the rights of the creditor, and becomes entitled to
the debt. Harper v. McVeigh, 82 V. 751, 1 S. E. 193; 2 Cal. Law Review, 337.
K. J. M.
PAYMENT-RIGHT OF APPROPRIATION.-Defendant Flesher was a building contractor. In February, 1926, he entered into a contract with defendants Burger and Burger, husband and wife, for the building of a residence
on a lot owned by them. By the terms of the contract Flesher was to
furnish all the labor and the materials. At the time the contract was
executed, Flesher had under construction a residence for one Jones, with
whom Flesher had a similar contract. The materials for both of these
contracts were purchased from the plaintiff lumber company. As the
materials were delivered, the plaintiff company charged the same to
Flesher. The materials for the Burger residence being charged on one
page of the ledger, and the materials for the Jones residence on another
page of the ledger. As the work progressed defendants Burgers paid
Flesher for the lumber he had purchased of plaintiff company for their
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job, except a balance of $73.29. On July 10, 1926, Flesher paid to the
plaintiff company $1686.55, but did not at that time give any directions
to plaintiff to which account the payment was to be credited. Plaintiff
on its own initiative gave credit to Flesher on the Jones account. On
October 4, 1926, Flesher made inquiry of plaintiff as to which of his
accounts had been given credit for the $1686.55 paid, and upon being
informed that the Jones account had received the credit, Flesher stated
that it had been his intention to apply this payment to the Burger account,
because the latter had been more prompt in paying him. It was thereupon
mutually agreed between Flesher and the plaintiff company to transfer
this payment to Burger's credit. Plaintiff company accordingly made the
change in its ledger. Thereafter, and without the consent or knowledge of
Flesher, the plaintiff company made a re-transfer of the credit to the Jones
account. Notice of the filing of a lien having been given, suit was commenced by plaintiff company against Burger and Burger to foreclose its lien
for the materials furnished for their job. The court below gave a verdit
for the plaintiff, but gave credit for the $1686.55. The plaintiff appeals
from the verdict. Held: Under the facts of this case, the creditor and
debtor, on October 4, 1926, had the right by mutual consent, to change, as
they did, the application of the payment previously made, and, having
done so, it was not thereafter within the power of the creditor at its own
instance to change the credit so made. Kendallville Lumber Co. v. Burger
et al, Appellate Court of Indiana, August 29, 1928. 162 N. E. 713.
A debtor who owes his creditor money on distinct and separate accounts,
or debts, may direct his payment to be applied to either, as he pleases. If
he omits to make any such appropriation, then the creditor has the right
to apply the payments to such debts due to him by the creditor as he may
choose. If the debtor pay with one intention, and the creditor receives
it with another, the intent of the debtor must govern. Neither party can
claim the right, however, to make an appropriation after a controversy
has arisen. Conduitt v. Ryan, 3 Ind. App. 1, 29 N. E. 160; Huff man v.
Cauble, 86 Ind. 591; Lazarus v. Freidheim, 51 Ark. 371, 11 S. W. 518;
Goodman v. Snow, 81 Hun. (N. Y.) 225, 30 N. Y. Supp. 672. The reason
for the rule is that up to the time of payment the money is the property
of the debtor and subject to his control. Baum v. Trantham, 42 S. C. 104,
19 S. E. 973, 46 Am. St. Rep. 697.
Where a debtor makes a payment to one to whom he owes several
debts and neither makes a specific appropriation of the payment, the court
will apply it as equity and justice require, having regard first to the
intention of the debtor, if it may be gathered from the circumstances.
U. S. v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 6 L. Ed. 199; Sanborn v.
Stark (C. C.) 31 Fed. 18; Howland v. Rouch, 7 Blackf. 236; King v. Andrews, 30 Ind. 429; Farren v. McDowell, 74 Hun (N. Y.) 176, 26 N. Y. S.
619; Henry Bill Pub. Co. v. Utley, 155 Mass. 366, 29 N. E. 635; Adam
Express Co. v. Black, 62 Ind. 128.
After an appropriation of a payment by the creditor, it cannot be
altered, except by mutual consent. Pearce v. Walker, 103 Ala. 250, 15
So. 568; Smith v. Wood, 1 N. J. Eq. (Saxt) 74; Chicago Lumber Co. v.
Woods, 53 Iowa 552, 5 N. W. 715; Hughes et al. v. McDougel et al., 17
Ind. 399; Hahn v. Geiger, 96 Ill. App. 104.
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An appropriation once directed can be changed by the consent of both
parties, and in such a case the indebtedness first discharged is revived
by implication of law, when there is no express promise. Rundlett v. Small,
25 Me. 29. If a particular application was directed at the time of the
payment, it was competent for the parties, by mutual consent, to change
it afterwards; or, if no application was made at the time, it was competent for the parties afterwards to agree on one different from what
the law would have made. Flarsheim v. Brestrup, 43 Minn. 298, 45 N. W.
438.
The conclusion reached by the Appellate Court is in accord with the
decided weight of authority on the question involved.
T. R. D.
RAILROADS-CoNTRIBUTORY

NEGLIGENCF--SUFFICIMNCY OF COMPLAINT.-

Plaintiff, as administrator, sued defendant alleging that decedent was
injured by defendant's negligence and without any fault or negligence on
the part of the decedent; that decedent was driving a truck along a highway in a careful manner and looked and listened for a car as he approached
the crossing, and that defendant's flagman negligently signalled decedent
to cross over the crossing in front of an interurban car which killed him.
Defendant interposed a demurrer on the ground that under the allegations
of the complaint decedent was as a matter of law guilty of contributory
negligence. The trial court overruled the demurrer and in the trial by
jury a verdict was found for the plaintiff. Held: Judgment affirmed.
Terre Haute, Indianapolis & Eastern Traction Co. v. Swalls, Appellate
Court of Indiana, July 20, 1926, 162 N. E. 446.
That the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries caused by the
alleged negligence of the defendant, need not allege or prove freedom from
contributory negligence is a settled rule in Indiana. Burns Annotated
Statutes, 1926, section 381; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Klee, 154
Ind. 430, 56 N. E. 234; Chicago & Eastern By. Co. v. Laporte, 33 App.
691, 71 N. E. 166; Southern By. Co. v. Corps, 37 App. 586, 76 N. E. 902.
The rule was different before the statute, it being then necessary for the
plaintiff to allege and prove freedom from contributory negligence unless
he was seeking recovery on the theory that the injury complained of was
wilfully or intentionally inflicted. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Staat's Ad?'r, 83 App. 680, at 684; Pennsy. Co. v. Sinclair,
62 Ind. 301, 30 Am. Rep. 185; Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 107
Ind. 51, 7 N. E. 807. But if the complaint shows on its face that the
injured party was guilty of contributory negligence, or if the plaintiff's
evidence establishes that fact, the plaintiff must fail notwithstanding the
statute. Rich v. Evansville & T. H. By. Co., 31 App. 10, 66 N. E. 1028.
Thus, where the plaintiff alleged that he was struck by defendant's train
while he was engrossed in watching a freight train which made considerable noise, and that although he could have easily been seen by defendant's servants in charge of the train which struck him, it approached
without warning, it was held that the complaint disclosed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and was
therefore demurrable. Van Winkle v. New York & St. L. Ry. Co., 34 Ind.
App. 478, 76 N. E. 157. The rule is that a complaint is sufficient as against
a demurrer if the plaintiff alleges facts disclosing a duty owed by the
defendant, and a negligent failure of defendant to perform that duty
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with a resulting injury to the plaintiff. Chicago C. C. & St. L. By. Co. V.
McStandish, 167 Ind. 648, 79 N. E. 903; Lake Erie & Western Ry. Co. v.
Bray, Adm'r, 42 App. 48, at 52, 84 N. E. 1004.
The Indiana rule that contributory negligence is a matter of defense
which the defendant must plead and prove is in force in the federal courts.
O'Harav. Central Ry. Co. of New Jersey, 183 Fed. 739.
On principle, the Indiana rule seems sound, but many jurisdictions such
as Illinois (West Chicago Street Ry Co. v. Liderman, 187 Ill. 463, 58 N. E.
367); Massachusetts (Lane v. Crombie, 12 Pick. 177); and New York
(Whalen v. Citizen's Gaslight Co., 151 N. Y. 70, 45 N. E. 363) are contra.
R. C. H.
WATERS

AND

WATER

COURSES--NoNNAvIGABLE

LAIFc--RELICTION

OF

WATE-The United States surveyed the section, of which the land in
question is a part, and made a plat thereof in 1834. Wolf Lake was shown
on said plat as a nonnavigable lake, and the meander lines were drawn
and shown on the plat marking the then shore or water line of the lake.
The land was platted into lots and the acreage in each lot above the water
line was shown. Pursuant to the Swamp Land Act of 1850 (USCA 982984) the United States donated the said section to the State of Indiana in
1850, and issued a patent for the same in 1853. The State then executed
its patent to the lots in question, which border on the lake, to the remote
grantors of the appellee, who is now the owner of said' lots by mesne
conveyances. The waters of Wolf Lake have gradually receded since the
survey, and the land in controversy, by reason of such reliction, is now
dry land. Action and cross-complaint to quiet title to land resulting from
said reliction. Held: That grantees of said lots as riparian owners
acquired title to portion which resulted from receding of waters of lake.
State v. Forsyth,Appellate Court of Indiana, July 17, 1928. 162 N. E. 661.
Meander lines are not boundary lines, but are run simply to determine
the sinuosities of the banks. The Tolleston Club v. State, 141 Ind. 197;
The Tolleston Club v. Clough, 146 Ind. 93; The Tolleston Club v. Lindgren,
39 Ind. App. 448; Railroad Co. v. Schurmier, 7 Wall. 272. Therefore the
extent of the appellee's estate is not to be determined by the meander lines
as they appear on the plat; but instead, the appellee's remote grantors took
as riparian owners. Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 35 Ore. 312; Grant v.
Hemphill, 92 Iowa 218; Bardwell v. Ames, 39 Mass. 333; Stoner v. Rice,
121 Ind. 51. The appellee, as a riparian proprietor, is entitled to the land
resulting from the reliction of the water, as he is the owner of the bed
of the lake to the thread thereof or within the boundaries of that partieular subdivision. Ridgway et al. v. Ludlow, 53 Ind. 248; Stoner v. Rice,
supra; Hilt Ice Co. v. Zahrt, 29 Ind. App. 476; Harin v. Jordan, 140 U. S.
371; Kean v. Calumet Canal and Improvement Co., 190 U. S. 452.
This decision represents the weight of authority-Arkansas, Rhodes
v. Cissel, 82 Ark. a67; California, Foss 'v. Johnstone, 158 Cal. 119; Idaho,
Donovon Co. v. Hope Mfg. Co., 194 Fed. 643; Michigan, Grand Rapids Ice
Co. v. South Grand Rapids Ice Co., 102 Mich. 227; Missouri, Kirkpatrick
v. Yates Ice Co., 45 Mo. App. 335; New Jersey, Kanouse v. Stockbower,
48 N. J. Eq. 42; Ohio, Bass Lake Co. v. Hollenbeck, 5 Ohio C. D. 242; Utah,
Poynter ,v. Chipman, 8 Utah 442; Florida, Broward v. Mabry, 59 Fla. 398;
Minnesota, Tucker v. Mortenson, 126 Minn. 214; North- Carolina, Hodges
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v. Williams, 95 N. C. 331; Pennsylvania, Smoulter V. Boyd, 10 Kulp 199;
South Dakota, Olson v. Huntamer, 6 S. D. 364; Tennessee, Webster v.
Harris, 111 Tenn. 668; Washington, Bernot v. Morrison, 81 Wash. 538;
New York, Deuternan v. Gainsborg, 41 N. Y. Supp. 185, being in accord.
However a contra doctrine has been adopted in the following jurisdictions:
Illinois, Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 462; Iowa, Carr v. Moore, 119 Iowa 152;
Louisiana, McDade v. Bossier Levee Board, 109 La. 625; Massachusetts,
Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Maine, Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198; New
Hampshire, Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 66 N. H. 1; Wisconsin, Attorney General ex Tel. Askew v. Smith, 109 Wis. 532; New Brunswick, Nash
J. A. B.
v. Newton, 30 N. 13. 610.

